Can Democrats Win Back Rust Belt Voters?

Democrats know they have a problem with working-class voters but don’t agree on the cause. Commentators chalk Kamala Harris’s 2024 loss to high prices, an unusually short campaign cycle, or voter resentment against the possibility of having an African American woman as president. But the Democratic Party’s working-class woes have much deeper roots.

Many voters in key battleground states feel burned by decades of Democrats’ unrealized promises to improve the lives of working people, failure to reign in obscene economic inequality, and support for economically disastrous policies — from NAFTA to the entrance of China to the World Trade Organization — that led to the loss of countless jobs and futures in their states. 

A new study from the Center for Working-Class Politics (CWCP), with the Labor Institute and Rutgers University, uses a 3,000-person YouGov survey in Michigan, Wisconsin, Ohio, and Pennsylvania to test whether economic populism — tapping into resentment and insecurity from decades of corporate excess and bipartisan neglect — can win back voters who’ve turned away from the Democratic Party.

Let’s start with the good news. Economic populism is popular among Rust Belt voters — particularly when it explicitly calls out corporate greed and mass layoffs. Strong economic populism — as opposed to “populist-lite” messaging that acknowledges there are few bad apples in the otherwise healthy barrel of large corporations — was particularly popular among many of the groups Democrats have struggled to reach: working-class voters, voters without a four-year college degree, voters whose incomes are less than $50k per year, and Latino voters.

But if economic populism is so popular, why did even the most stalwart Rust Belt economic populists — like former Ohio Senator Sherrod Brown — struggle in 2024? The survey reveals that the Democratic Party label often drags the message underwater. When the very same populist message was delivered by a candidate labeled “Democrat” rather than “Independent,” support dropped by an average of 8.4 points — a gap that balloons into double digits in Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin. In Pennsylvania, by contrast, there’s no meaningful penalty. In races decided by a few points, that brand discount can prove decisive. 

To identify the best path forward for economic populists, the survey next assessed Rust Belt voters’ top economic policy priorities. Across ideological lines, respondents prioritized policies framed around fairness, anti-corruption, and economic security. Proposals like capping prescription drug prices, stopping corporate price gouging, and reigning in political corruption were among the top priorities regardless of partisanship or class. Policies to raise taxes on the wealthy and expand access to good jobs also performed well.

A new proposal barring companies that take taxpayer money from laying off workers also polled surprisingly well — and held up under Republican attacks. The policy was popular even though respondents had never heard of it and it challenges corporations’ right to chase short-term profit at communities’ expense, putting it well outside the acceptable range of mainstream Democratic economic proposals. The policy directly channels Rust Belt communities’ resentment over decades of mass layoffs into a commonsense rule —“if you take from the public, you can’t harm the public”— while signaling a tougher, jobs-first stance than Democrats typically embrace.

Costly or abstract proposals — such as $1,000 monthly payments to all Americans or a trillion-dollar industrial policy for clean energy — as well as traditional conservative ideas like corporate tax cuts and deregulation ranked poorly overall, drawing only pockets of partisan support.

The survey results suggest two simultaneous paths to success for economic populists. In competitive districts where running as an independent would do little beyond ensure Republican victory, a party hoping to win back the working class should rebuild the Democratic brand by running disciplined and bold economic populist campaigns around policies to reduce costs, create good jobs, and hold elites accountable. Candidates who show independence from donor-class priorities and build a track record as champions of working-class priorities can still make the “D” stand for something again. 

In other contexts, however, economic populists should test independent campaigns—following the model of Nebraska’s 2024 independent Senate candidate Dan Osborne. This should be strategic, targeting deep-red districts and states where running outside the Democratic Party won’t simply hand the race to Republicans, but there are many places where it could be viable. The study also finds majority support for creating an Independent Workers Political Association to back such efforts, with enthusiasm highest among non-college voters, young people, voters of color, and the economically insecure, and with meaningful support from independents and Republicans as well.

In short, progressive economic populism can win back Rust Belt voters — inside the Democratic Party where necessary, outside it where possible. The most effective strategy is not mysterious: speak plainly about who profits from layoffs and price gouging and focus obsessively on policies that put workers first. If Democrats want to win, they’ll need to put delivering good jobs and holding corporations accountable at the center of everything they do and say. The path to victory in 2026 and beyond lies in giving voters a reason to believe that Democrats (and independent economic populists) have their backs while Republicans continue to cut workers’ benefits and do nothing to bring back jobs and dignity to long-suffering Rust Belt communities.